

AMENDED CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN ASSESSMENT



21 & 22 BURNHAM CLOSE THORNTON

NEW GENERATION BOARDING HOUSE

PREPARED FOR
ZOE MAY PTY LTD

PREPARED BY



CONTACT INFORMATION
MICHAEL BREWER


PO BOX 258 EAST MAITLAND
NSW 2323
M: 049 049 5656
WWW.415UPS.COM.AU

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE CLIENT

This Amended Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Assessment (CPTED) has been prepared without prejudice for Zoe May Pty Ltd to accompany a Development Application (DA 18/1394) to Maitland City Council and updated following a Section 34 Conference held on 5 November 2021. It relates to the operation of a New Generation Boarding House (the boarding house).

1.2 THIS REPORT

This report has been undertaken to respond to Item 10 of the Statement of Facts and Contentions (SOFAC), which states:

10. Security

10.1 An assessment against Part C.12 of MDCP Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design has not been provided.

Part C.12 of the Maitland Development Control Plan 2012 (MDCP) does not specify that boarding house developments require a CPTED assessment, unless it is defined by Council as *“other high use areas or developments where crime may be an issue.”* Council have not stated the proposal is such a development, nor have Council made any statement that crime may be an issue.

This report has been prepared utilising field data obtained during site inspections undertaken on 6 May 2019, 11 August 2019, 9 December 2019, 23 June 2020, 15 January 2021 and 10 August 2021.

1.3 THE PURPOSE OF CPTED

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime prevention strategy that focuses on the planning, design and structure of cities and neighbourhoods. CPTED reduces opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles that reduce the likelihood of essential crime ingredients (law, offender, victim or target, opportunity) from intersecting in time and space.

In NSW, CPTED initiatives have been employed since the early 1990's through the implementation of the Safer by Design program. The program is a co-operative initiative involving the NSW Police, local councils, government departments and key private sector organisations. The aim of the program is to ensure that development application proposals are routinely assessed for crime risk, and that preventable risk is reduced before the development is approved.

Offenders often make cost-benefit assessment of potential victims and locations before committing crime. CPTED aims to create the reality (or perception) that the costs of committing crime are greater than the likely benefits. This is achieved by creating environmental and social conditions that:

- Maximise the risk to offenders (increasing the likelihood of detection, challenge and apprehension);
- Maximise the effort required to commit crime (increasing the time, energy and resources required to commit crime);
- Minimise the actual and perceived benefits of crime (removing, minimising or concealing crime attractors and rewards); and
- Minimise excuse making opportunities (removing conditions that encourage/facilitate rationalisation of inappropriate behaviour).

CPTED employs four key strategies, namely:

- Surveillance;
- Access Control;
- Territorial Reinforcement; and
- Space/ Activity Management.

The four key strategies have been applied to the development proposal and analysis and commentary is provided in below and within the following pages.

1.4 THE DEVELOPMENT

The proposed development involves the demolition of the existing structures on the Site and construction of a New Generation Boarding House containing 31 boarding rooms, with associated communal facilities, parking and landscaped areas, as well as an on-site manager's residence.

In general, the proposed development will comprise:

- 31 x double boarding rooms, of which Rooms 11 and 31 are accessible rooms.
- A manager's residence.
- Two (2) communal laundries - one on each level.
- Communal gardens/ outdoor spaces on each level and a communal living room on the upper level.
- Pedestrian access points off both Burnham Close and Taylor Avenue.
- A stair well at the main entrance and a stair well and lift core located centrally and serving both levels plus the basement car park.

- 30 car parking spaces including two disabled spaces, one dedicated electric vehicle space, one car share space, a dedicated Manager's car space and three visitor spaces.
- 7 x motorcycle parking spaces and 8 x bicycle rack spaces.
- External and internal bin storage areas.
- A utility room.
- Landscaped open space areas for use by residents with provision for generous deep soil zones.

2 THE SITE

The Site is legally described as Lots 11 and 12 in DP 246016 and known as 21 and 22 Burnham Close, Thornton, respectively, as shown in Figure 1 below. Existing structures on the Site are as follows:

- No. 21 - Brick dwelling with metal roofing and two paved areas
- No. 22 - Weatherboard dwelling with tiled roof, metal car port and 2 metal garden sheds


FIGURE 1: SITE AERIAL VIEW



SOURCE SIX MAPS 2020



AERIAL VIEW OF SUBJECT SITE



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3 CRIME AND SAFETY CONTEXT

As part of the assessment process, a review of crime and safety issues identified in the Maitland LGA, derived from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), has been undertaken and provides a relevant baseline of data.

It is important to point out that the crime figures discussed in this section of the report relate to those crimes that have been recorded by BOCSAR i.e. Recorded Incidents (RI), not necessarily all crimes committed in the Maitland LGA.

Levels of crime are sensitive to the willingness or ability of people to report crime, levels and nature of police activity and actual levels of criminal activity.

In addition, it is pointed out that crime data must be interpreted with caution as many factors may influence apparent trends. Police “crackdowns”, for example, on particular types of offences may push up recorded crime rates for those categories of offences. The increase in figures therefore does not necessarily translate to an increase in that type of crime, but rather an increase in convictions for that type of crime.

Table 1 below shows the incidence of particular crimes per 100,000 head of population within the Maitland LGA and Thornton between July 2020 to June 2021. NSW averages are provided in brackets for comparison. Figure 2 below also shows how Thornton is placed in comparison to surrounding suburbs in terms of assaults, demonstrating a very low incidence within Thornton.


TABLE 1: CRIME STATISTICS

OFFENCE TYPE	MAITLAND LGA	2 YEAR TREND	THORNTON	2 YEAR TREND
ASSAULT	968.7 (816.5)	Stable	800.2 (816.5)	Up 63% per year
HOMICIDE	1.2 (1.1)	Stable	0.0 (1.1)	Stable
ROBBERY	27 (26.2)	Stable	0.0 (26.2)	Stable
SEXUAL OFFENCES	305.3 (200.9)	Stable	149.2 (200.9)	Stable
BREAK AND ENTER DWELLING	295.9 (237.6)	Stable	234.7 (237.6)	Stable

OFFENCE TYPE	MAITLAND LGA	2 YEAR TREND	THORNTON	2 YEAR TREND
BREAK AND ENTER NON- DWELLING	145.6 (87.4)	Stable	85.4 (87.4)	Stable
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	191.4 (142.3)	Stable	160.0 (142.3)	Stable
STEAL FROM MOTOR VEHICLE	403.9 (354.7)	Stable	448.1 (354.7)	Stable
STEAL FROM DWELLING	288.8 (202.9)	Stable	160.0 (202.9)	Stable
STEAL FROM PERSON	20.0 (25.8)	Stable	0.0 (25.8)	Stable
FRAUD	527.2 (552.3)	Stable	437.4 (552.3)	Stable
MALICIOUS PROPERTY DAMAGE	915.9 (659.0)	Stable	714.8 (659.0)	Stable
AGAINST JUSTICE PROCEDURES	1055.6 (980.1)	Stable	618.8 (980.1)	Stable
BREACH AVO	312.3 (253.1)	Stable	330.7 (253.1)	Stable
DISORDERLY CONDUCT	187.9 (219.3)	Stable	74.7 (219.3)	Stable
DRUG OFFENCES	489.6 (588.8)	Stable	234.7 (588.8)	Stable

SOURCE: BOSCAR NSW CRIME TOOL DEC 2021

FIGURE 2: THORNTON AND SURROUNDING SUBURBS COMPARISON (ASSAULT)



SOURCE: BOSCAR NSW CRIME TOOL 2021

4 CPTED ASSESSMENT

This report considers each of the CPTED principles as outlined in Parts A and B of the *Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications- Guidelines under Section 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, 2001* (The Guidelines). This report also addresses the matters identified in Section C12 - Crime Prevention through Environmental Design of the Maitland Development Control Plan 2011 (MDCP), even though Development Control 1 does not identify the proposal, as stated above.

4.1 SURVEILLANCE

The Guidelines state on page 4:

The attractiveness of crime targets can be reduced by providing opportunities for effective surveillance, both natural and technical.

Good surveillance means that people can see what others are doing. People feel safe in public areas when they can easily see and interact with others. Would be offenders are often deterred from committing crime in areas with high levels of surveillance.

From a design perspective, 'deterrence' can be achieved by:

- *clear sightlines between public and private places*
- *effective lighting of public places*
- *landscaping that makes places attractive, but does not provide offenders with a place to hide or entrap victims.*

Consideration has been given to passive and active surveillance for the proposed boarding house. The pedestrian access to Taylor Avenue is clearly defined with a direct pathway from the boundary and existing footpath to the front door. At the ground level, the Manager's Room and entry foyer have clear sightlines to the street and the entry path. The foyer also serves as a control point the define the private from the public areas. In addition, the communal living room is located at the first floor, with clear sight lines over entry point onto Taylor Avenue.

The Manager's residence, as well as rooms 6-16 on the first floor and rooms 26-31 on the upper level also have direct sightlines from within the rooms and on the associated balconies onto the adjoining pedestrian pathway and linear reserve to deter potential anti-social behaviour.

The Site entry point from Burnham Close, while located within the centre of the property, will be overlooked by the proposed CCTV system, as well as rooms 1-4 and 17-20 on the first floor and rooms 21-24 and the communal roof garden on

the floor above. Landscaping within each frontage will be maintained or kept low to facilitate passive surveillance and deter potential anti-social behaviour.

Although a lighting plan will be provided at the Construction Certificate stage, a condition of consent can be included on the approval that effective lighting is provided to each frontage of the site, in addition to the existing street lights. Internally within the development, lighting will be included across the site to ensure that residents can safely use the premises. All common areas will be lit in compliance with the Australian Standards.

Landscaping will be provided in various locations along all of the setbacks of the proposed building. The design of the landscaping has been carefully selected to ensure that it provides for both safety, amenity and privacy across the site. The landscape design, within the street setbacks incorporates a design that will ensure there is adequate variety and depth in the plantings while maintaining sight lines.

The location of the outdoor ground level communal areas is such that passive surveillance can be achieved from Rooms 1-4 and the balcony off the central communal space, as well as Rooms 21-24 and the communal balcony above. The design of the landscaping across the Site will be lush and verdant without being excessively dense or dangerous for concealment. The design, coupled with the changes in levels over the Site will provide visual interest, protect the privacy of the residents of the adjoining properties without providing potential hiding spaces.

The provision of open blade fencing along the frontage to Taylor Avenue and the adjoining public walkway and reserve will also facilitate easy casual surveillance of these public domain interfaces.

4.2 ACCESS CONTROL

The Guidelines state on page 5:

Physical and symbolic barriers can be used to attract, channel or restrict the movement of people. They minimise opportunities for crime and increase the effort required to commit crime.

By making it clear where people are permitted to go or not go, it becomes difficult for potential offenders to reach and victimise people and their property. Illegible boundary markers and confusing spatial definition make it easy for criminals to make excuses for being in restricted areas. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the barriers are not tall or hostile, creating the effect of a compound.

Effective access control can be achieved by creating:

- *landscapes and physical locations that channel and group pedestrians into target areas*
- *public spaces which attract, rather than discourage people from gathering*
- *restricted access to internal areas or high-risk areas (like car parks or other rarely visited areas). This is often achieved through the use of physical barriers.*

The areas of public and private and communal and private spaces are clearly defined within the development. Each frontage of the development provides a clearly defined point that separates private and public space. The boundary fencing and entry statements at each street frontage help define the Site and channel people to the designated entry points where passive and active surveillance measures are employed.

Further, access into the garage from the front of the building will be secured with a roller door, to avoid any potential crime risk. All boarders will also be issued with a security fob or key card to facilitate access.

4.3 TERRITORIAL REINFORCEMENT

With regard to territorial reinforcement, the Guidelines state on page 5:

Community ownership of public space sends positive signals. People often feel comfortable in, and are more likely to visit, places which feel owned and cared for.

Well used places also reduce opportunities for crime and increase risk to criminals.

If people feel that they have some ownership of public space, they are more likely to gather and to enjoy that space. Community ownership also increases the likelihood that people who witness crime will respond by quickly reporting it or by attempting to prevent it. Territorial reinforcement can be achieved through:

- *design that encourages people to gather in public space and to feel some responsibility for its use and condition*
- *design with clear transitions and boundaries between public and private space*
- *clear design cues on who is to use space and what it is to be used for. Care is needed to ensure that territorial reinforcement is not achieved by making public spaces private spaces, through gates and enclosures.*

The principle of territorial reinforcement has been incorporated in the design of the development through the inclusion of the ground floor common open space near the Burnham Close entry point and the pedestrian entry and a large entry foyer outside the Manager's room at the Taylor Avenue entrance. The communal balconies in the middle of the building facing Burnham Close will also assist in this regard. Focussed activity areas adjacent to the Site entry points helps to activate

the street frontage for residents coming into the building and encourage a sense of community and transparency to the communal areas. This will further enhance the sense of community and will provide an avenue for quick rectification if something should happen to the premises.

The provision of open blade fencing along the frontage to Taylor Avenue and the adjoining public walkway and reserve will provide an effective barrier that is not conducive to graffiti. The open nature of the fencing and ability to see through it will deter antisocial activity as it facilitates casual surveillance of the public domain interfaces by the residents of the boarding house.

In addition, the Plan of Management (POM), which is provided under separate cover, formalises the commitment to maintain and present the property in a pleasant way in terms of landscaping, waste management and security facilities.

4.4 SPACE MANAGEMENT

With regard to the principle of space management, page 5 of the Guidelines states:

Popular public space is often attractive, well maintained and well used space. Linked to the principle of territorial reinforcement, space management ensures that space is appropriately utilised and well cared for.

Space management strategies include activity coordination, site cleanliness, rapid repair of vandalism and graffiti, the replacement of burned out pedestrian and car park lighting and the removal or refurbishment of decayed physical elements.

Part C.12 of the MDCP notes that a CPTED report is required for certain types of development, however it does not specifically state that a boarding house is deemed to be an “other high use areas or developments where crime may be an issue.”

The Architectural Plans, Landscape Plan and the POM accompanying the development package formalise the addressed CPTED principles. The maintenance and ongoing management of the building will be undertaken, in accordance with the POM, with the primary responsibility being undertaken by the on-site manager. Within the development the common areas are clearly identifiable from the private areas, simply from the ease of access. The common rooms will be accessible for all and the private rooms will be each provided with a lockable door.

With respect to graffiti management, there is a greater risk that fencing and blind elevated areas are more prone to being defaced by graffiti “tags”. The most likely point where this would occur is the perimeter fencing to the pedestrian reserve. This can be dealt with in one of two ways – either by rapid removal and the use of

graffiti-resistant coatings or replacement of the colourbond fencing with open style fencing which is harder to "tag" or paint large blocks of graffiti on. This can be dealt with by way of the imposition of suitable conditions in any consent.

5 RESPONSE TO COUNCIL'S CONCERNS

Council's Information Requests have rather simply stated that a CPTED assessment was required (despite the DCP stating otherwise), however it was not until Council's assessment report was presented to the Council meeting on 8 June 2021, that Council elaborated on any specific concerns. Council's assessment report notes as follows:

Part C.12 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Crime prevention through environmental design ensures that good urban and environmental planning leads to safer communities. The applicant was requested to provide an assessment against this chapter of the DCP, however did not provide any such assessment.

It is noted that there are some areas of concern from a safety perspective. This includes the blade walls perpendicular to the car park wall, in the communal open space area on the ground floor. These blade walls raise CPTED concerns as they can provide shelter for people to hide behind. The communal open space shown on the ground floor is also not visible from the street or from communal areas which creates a safety issue.

RESPONSE:

As a consequence, the blade walls set perpendicular to the car park wall have been removed in the subsequent design iterations. In terms of visibility of the ground floor communal open space area, passive surveillance is provided by both the boarding rooms above and the communal garden areas on each level. Additionally, the proposed CCTV system will be able to monitor this area and the pathways approaching it. The ground floor communal open space area is also immediately adjacent to the visitor parking areas and entry foyer, which are key activity areas within the development. Given that Burnham Close is a cul-de-sac, it is highly unlikely that pedestrian movements within the street would be a reliable mechanism to provide passive surveillance opportunities and accordingly, the passive and active measures proposed will result in acceptable outcomes.

6 CONCLUSION

The proposal for a boarding house at 21-22 Burnham Close Thornton has been considered in detail in relation to the CPTED principles and has been assessed against them. The design is in line with the principles of CPTED and the ongoing management of the proposal will ensure that this is maintained in the use of the building.